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RECENT CASES
BAILVIENTS-MISDELIVERY-CONVERSION. Plaintiff left a sum of money
in an envelope with defendant for gratuitous safekeeping. Later, plaintiff
was committed to the state hospital for the insane and while so confined
signed an order authorizing her son to receive the envelope. Without
knowing of the plaintiff's condition, but after checking the signature on
the order with those on the bailed envelope, defendant delivered the en-
velope to the son. The bailor later sued for misdelivery of the property.
Held: The bailee, not being guilty of gross negligence in delivering the
bailed property to a third person, is not liable, notwithstanding the bailor's
actual mental condition at the time of signing the order. Maitlen v. Hazene
109 Wash. Dec. 172, 113 P. (2d) 1008 (1941).
According to the majority view, there are two aspects to the obligation
imposed by the bailment contract. The bailee, besides owing the duty
of using varying degrees of care in safeguarding the subject of the bail-
ment from damage, depending upon the class of bailment, also owes to the
bailor the duty of redelivering the property to him upon demand when
the purposes of the bailment have been fulfilled. The degree of diligence
that is exacted of each of the several classes of bailees in respect to the
care of the thing bailed ordinarily has no application to the liability of the
bailee in respect to its return. Harlan State Bank v. Banner Creek Coal
Corp., 202 Ky. 639, 261 S. W. 16 (1924). Misdelivery is conversion without
regard to the care and diligence exercised by the bailee, Jenkins v. Bacon,
111 Mass. 373 (1873); Hall v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 14 Allen 439 (1867);
Notes (1921) 15 A. L. R. 687, (1926) 42 A. L. R. 138, (1928) 54 A. L. R. 1330,
or his utmost good faith, Baer v. Slater, 261 Mass. 153, 158 N. E. 328 (1927);
Byer v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 8 Cal. (2d) 297, 65 P. (2d) 67 (1937).
And the fact that the bailment is gratuitous does not relieve the bailee
from the absolute liability for delivery to the wrong person. Serry v.
Knepper, 101 Iowa 372, 70 N. W. 601 (1897); Marlow v. Conway Iron Works,
130 S. C. 256, 125 S. E. 569 (1924).
In the Maitlen case the court seems to hold the gratuitous bailee for
only slight care in redelivery, confusing the prevailing rule as to the duty
to care for the property with the duty to redeliver it. The result may be
correct in the instant case, since the court also decided that there was
sufficient evidence to support the finding that plaintiff was lucid when she
signed the order authorizing delivery to her son. Moreover, it may well
be desirable to reject the rule which makes the bailee a strict insurer
for redelivery of the bailed property. But the Maitlen decision was reached
without any conscious election to establish a minority rule. For this
reason, and because an early Washington case imposed strict accountabil-
ity upon the bailee by the application of orthodox principles of conversion,
Kahaley v. Haley, 15 Wash. 678, 47 Pac. 23 (1896), the Maitlen case can-
not be considered a definitive rejection of the majority doctrine.
W. J. D.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE--AssGNmENT-RECORDING STATuTE. A mortgaged an
automobile to B, who recorded the mortgage. B assigned the mortgage
to C, who did not record the assignment. Thereafter, B repossessed the
automobile and sold it to D, taking D's mortgage and recording it. B then
assigned D's mortgage to E, giving him a satisfaction of A's mortgage. E
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recorded his assignment B repossessed the automobile and delivered it
E, who sold it. C, upon learning of the subsequent transactions, brought
suit against E for conversion. Held: Under Washington statute, the as-
signee of a chattel mortgage must record his assignment in order to pro-
tect his. title as against an innocent third party who, by fraudulent act
of the assignor, paid value to said assignor for an assignment of a subse-
quent mortgage on the same property. General Credit Corp. v. Lee James,
Inc., 8 Wn. (2d) 185, 111 P. (2d) 762 (1941).
The applicable statute, and the only one relating to recording of
assignments of chattel mortgages, is 11mw. REv. STAT. § 10616, providing
that "any person to whom any... mortgage has been... assigned, may,
after the assignment has been recorded in the office of the county auditor
of the county wherein such mortgage is of record, acknowledge satis-
faction of the mortgage, and discharge the same of record."
While the language of this statute is not mandatory, the interpretation
placed thereon by our Supreme Court, insofar as third persons are con-
cerned, gives the statute mandatory effect, the court holding that an
unrecorded assignment of a mortgage is invalid as against subsequent
bona fide purchasers. Erickson v. Kendall, 112 Wash. 26, 191 Pac. 842
(1920); Seattle National Bank v. Ally, 66 Wash. 610, 120 Pac. 94 (1912);
Summy v. Ramsey, 53 Wash. 93, 101 Pac. 506 (1909); Gottstein v. Harring-
ton, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901). However, in these cases the mortgagee
gave the subsequent purchaser a release, albeit unauthorized, of the
mortgage; in the Lee James case the mortgagee gave the assignee of the
subsequent mortgage a satisfaction of the prior mortgage, but no such
satisfaction was given to the subsequent purchaser-mortgagor.
Notice of the first mortgage by its record makes it a duty of the
subsequent purchaser in the exercise of proper diligence to inquire whether
his vendor, the mortgagee, is still owner of the mortgage, and his omis-
sion to make that inquiry deprives him of the protection due a bona fide
purchaser. Oregon Trust Co. v. Shaw, 5 Saw. 336 (C. C. D. Ore. 1878):
Burhans v. Hutcheson, 25 Kan. 435, 37 Am. Rep. 274 (1881).
The failure to record the assignment does not invalidate the record
of the mortgage itself. Enos v. Cook, 65 Cal. 175, 3 Pac. 632 (1884); Burt
v. Moore, 62 Kan. 536, 64 Pac. 57 (1901), and, accordingly, several cases
hold that a subsequent purchaser cannot avoid a prior mortgage on the
ground that an assignment of such mortgage was not recorded, unless
the vendor enters a satisfaction of the mortgage of record. Middlekauff v.
Bell, 111 Kan. 206, 207 Pac. 184 (1922); Peoples Trust Co. v. Tonkonogy,
144 App. Div. 333, 128 N. Y. S. 1055 (1911).
Where the mortgagee assigned the mortgage, which assignment was
not recorded, and then executed a fraudulent release to a subsequent
purchaser, the latter could rely upon the release and be protected as
against the unrecorded assignment. Frank v. Snow, 6 Wyo. 42, 42 Pac. 484
(1895). This is the rule applied in the previous Washington cases. The
assignment statute is construed to protect a: subsequent purchaser of the
mortgaged property, giving him greater rights than his vendor had, where
the assignment is not recorded. A priori, the same protection would be
extended to subsequent assignees of the mortgage.
But it is going much further to hold, as the Lee James case does, that
the protection of the assignment statute extends similarly to an assignee
of a different and later mortgage which was clearly a junior mortgage
19421
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at the time of its execution. The theoretical dubiousness of this holding
would produce more obvious practical difficulties in the form of redemp-
tion questions if a similar rule were announced for real property cases.
Sound principles of statutory construction would seem to condemn such
a construction of a statute so devoid of any indication that the legislature
intended that result.
M. D. C.
CORPORATIONS-CREDITORS--STATUTORY LIABILITY or DIRECTORS. A cor-
poration was organized under the laws of Washington, and an affidavit
was filed to the effect that the stated amount of capital with which it was
to begin business had in fact been paid in. Actually, none of that stated
amount had been paid. The corporation nevertheless transacted business,
in violation of REm. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 3803-8 (1), and incurred
the debt on which this action is based. Suit is by an individual creditor
at law against a director of the corporation to enforce the defendant's
statutory liability imposed by REM. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 3803-8 (2)
for all debts resulting from such unlawful transaction of business. Held:
This suit is equitable in character and is to enforce only a limited liability
imposed by the statute, so all directors and creditors must be joined
before such suit can be maintained. Royer v. Maib, 6 Wn. (2d) 286, 107
P. (2d) 335 (1940), af'd on rehearing, 6 Wn. (2d) 294, 111 P. (2d) 593
(1941).
No prior case has been found in Washington in which this provision
of our Business Corporations Act has been construed. The holding seems
to be based on the court's conclusion that the liability imposed on directors
participating in or not dissenting from the violation of this statute for
"debts or liabilities of the corporation arising therefrom" is a limited
one. In support of the holding, several cases are cited in which a creditor
of the corporation was not permitted to sue directors in an individual
action. Homer v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228 (1876); Platner v. Hughes, 200 Iowa
1363, 206 N. W. 268 (1925); Webb v. Cash, 35 Wyo. 398, 250 Pac. 1 (1926).
However, each of those cases dealt with statutes of a different type from
the one here involved; in each of them, a creditor was suing to enforce
a statutory liability imposed on directors for permitting the corporation to
incur debts in excess of the statutory limit, in which situation the statute
allowed creditors to sue for such excess. In that situation the rule seems
to be well established that only a representative suit for the benefit of
all creditors covered by the statute is permissible, the underlying theory
being that in that situation a common limited fund for the benefit of
all eligible creditors is created, out of which fund no single creditor
may obtain more than his proportionate share.
Under R Ev. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 3803-8, however, liability is im-
posed on directors for permitting or failing to dissent from the transac-
tion of business by the corporation before the stated paid-in capital has
been actually paid, and the liability is for "the debts or liabilities of the
corporation arising therefrom." Here, the purpose of the statute seems
to be to entitle each creditor whose claim is a result of such unlawful
transaction of business to sue not only the corporation, but the defaulting
officers and directors as well, for the full amount of the debt. It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that in fact there is no real limit to the liability imposed;
that it extends to the full amount of all debts incurred by the trans-
action of business in violation of the statute. There is no element of a
(VOL. 17
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common fund of limited scope such as there is when the iability is only
foi the excess of the debts over the statutory limit. The limit is not on
the liability of the director, but merely on the number of corporate debts
which are included within the statute.
"This case, therefore, seems to fall within the rule stated in 13 Am.
Jums. 1012: 'Where the liability of a defaulting officer is absolute and
unlimited, except by the amount of the corporate debts which fall within
the terms of the statute, and the amount which one creditor may collect
will not reduce that which another may recover, . . . an action may be
maintained by a single creditor to enforce such liability." And Patterson
v. Minnesota Mfg. Co., 41 Minn. 84, 42 N. W. 926 (1889), relied on by the
plaintiff in the instant case, seems to be in point as support for his position.
M. 0.
EDc ,-WAIvEn-DEAD Mx STATUTE. RsEI. REv. STAT. § 1211 (the so-
called "dead man" statute), while removing the common law interest-
disqualification from witnesses, adds the proviso that an interested person
suing or defending against the administrator, etc., of one deceased shall
not be admitted to testify in his own behalf as to transactions. had by'
him or statements made to him or in his presence by the deceased. In
an action by deceased's widow to set aside a conveyance by him to de-
fendant corporation, two of its officers and shareholders (deemed inter-
ested persons under the statute) were permitted to testify, over objection,
to transactions between themselves and deceased. .Held: the evidence was
admissible, because, by herself testifying to the transactions, at which she
too 'was present, plaintiff waived the protection of the statute. Johnston
v. Medina Improvement Club, 110 Wash. Dec. 77, 116 P. (2d) 272 (1941).
. The same question has arisen before. O'Connor v. Slatter, 48 Wash.
493, 93 Pac. 1078 (1908) (opinion by Judge Rudkin), held that'such testi-
mony on behalf of the estate did not waive the statute. "The prohibition
of the statute... admits of no qualification or exception .... " In de-
ciding the Johnston case the court took no notice of the O'Connor case,
but relied upon a subsequent series of cases finding waiver of § 1211 in
various circumstances-Robertson v. O'Neill, 67 Wash. 121, 120 Pac. 884
(1912) (after objectionable testimony, administrator sought'by cross-ex-
amination to establish the estate's counterclaim); Levy v. Simon, 119 Wash.
179, 185, 205 Pac. 426 (1922) (administrator introduced parts of adverse
party's testimony in a previous proceeding, whereupon adverse" party
introduced the remainder); Johnston v. Clark, 120' Wash. 25, 206 Pac. 914
(1922) (testimony elicited by administrator himself, on cross-examination);
Floe v. Anderson, 124 Wash. 438, 214 Pac. 827 (1923) (administrator called
adverse party as witness; adverse party's attorney cross-examined); Greg-
ory v. Peabody, 157 Wash. 674, 290 Pac. 232 (1930) (one answer, probably
not .open to objection, followed by extended cross-examination of adverse
party as to transactions and'statements inferentially referred to). Thete
cases seem easily distinguishable from the situation in the Johnston and
O',Connor cases.
Nevertheless, considerable can be said for the result of the Johniton
case. For one thing, there seems little reason for restricting the adverse'
party when an equally interested person testifies on behalf of the estate
to transactions with deceased; one is is apt to lie as the othei; -and if 6ne
testifies, the others version shoffld b'admittdd& For another,' the restrid-
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ion upon evidence imposed by the statute may not be wise. See Note
(1936) 11 WASH. L. REV. 270; McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence
(1938) 24 A. B. A. J. at 511 ("['Where one man's lips are closed by death,
the other's must be closed by law'] has a specious equity which conceals
a baneful potency for injustice. It is a sin against the light, when in the
name of solicitude for the dead, the law permits one set of living folks
to set off another's claim without a fair hearing."); Report of Committee
on Improvements in the Law of Evidence of the American Bar Association
(1938) 63 A. B. A. REP. 581 (permitting survivor to testify has aided in
ascertaining truth, and it is recommended that statutes such as § 1211 be
discarded); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 578, 578a ("as a matter
of policy, this survival of a part of the now discarded interest-disqualifi-
cation is deplorable in every respect; for it is based on a fallacious and
exploded principle .. "). Washington decisions have not, however, re-
flected any persistent adverse view of the policy of the statute. For ex-
ample, there has been no consistent disposition to narrow construction;
cf. Sackman v. Thomas, 24 Wash. 660, 673, 64 Pac. 819, 823 (1901) (strict
construction), with Nicholson v. Kilbury, 80 Wash. 500, 141 Pac. 1043 (1914)
(restrictive policy of the statute should be carried out). However, the court
is finding increasing exceptions in the form of implied waivers; see the
instant case, and those cited in support of it.
On the other hand, the "plain language of the statute", read whole, does
not seem to permit of the result of the Johnston case. Hutcheson, The
Admissibiliby of Testimony Concerning Transactions With Decedents (1925)
1 WASH. L. REV. 21. With due deference it is suggested that the question
of the Johnston case cannot be finally settled until the court considers
the prior contrary holding in O'Connor v. Slatter. M. B. C.
MALPRACTICE-EXPERT TESTIMONY-FUNCTION OF JURY. In a malpractice
action against a physician for pain and suffering and permanent loss of
eyesight resulting from the alleged failure to diagnose and treat properly
an injury resulting when the plaintiff was struck in the eyes by liquid
and fumes from an exploding refrigerator which he had been trying to
repair, the expert witnesses called by each side sharply disagreed as to
whether the physician should have applied water to the plaintiff's eyes. In
holding that there was no case for the jury, the Washington court said:
"Where physicians and surgeons of equal skill and learning, being in no
way impeached and discredited, disagree in their opinions as to what
the proper treatment of a patient should be, the jury in a malpractice
action will not be allowed to accept one theory to the exclusion of another.
and hence there is nothing on which a verdict by a jury can be based."
Peddicord v. Leiser, 5 Wn. (2d) 190, 105 P. (2d) 5 (1940).
Ordinarily, of course, the fact that one expert is contradicted by an-
other does not preclude the jury from accepting the testimony of the
former. The Washington court apparently has restricted its exception to
this universally accepted rule to disputes as to proper medical treatment,
holding that the exception has no application to disputed questions of fact.
in which case it is Within the jury's province to reconcile any conflict
in the expert testimony. Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489, 68 P. (2d) 1034
(1937). See also Howat v. Cartwright, 128 Wash. 343, 222 Pac. 496 (1924).
While but few courts have had an occasion to decide the narrow ques-
tion thus presented, the Washington court stands alone in holding that
there is no case for the jury in such a situation. In an Iowa case, in an
I[VOL. 17
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action against physicians for the negligent treatment of a patient where
the testimony of experts as to whether the method of treatment adopted
by the defendants -was proper was conflicting, the court followed the
normal rule and held the determination of the question was for the jury.
commenting that "the value of expert opinion cannot be determined by
counting noses, and, even though six physicians took one view and but
one the other, the issue was for the jury to decide." Toamer v. Aiken, 126
Iowa 114, 101 N. W. 769 (1904). In Bennisoan v. Walbank, 38 Minn. 313, 37
N. W. 447 (1888), where the expert witnesses differed as to the conditions
under which amputation should be resorted to under the particular cir-
cumstances, the Minnesota court held that it was for the jury to determine;
and, in comparing and weighing the opinions of such witnesses upon a
given state of facts, the jury must necessarily consider the relative value
of the testimony of the different witnesses, having reference to their
knowledge and experience, their freedom from bias, and the reasons they
are able to give for their conclusions. The Nebraska court has followed a
similar rule, recognizing that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Stohlman
v. Davis, 117 Neb. 178, 220 N.W. 247, 60 A. L. R. 658 (1928); Hewitt v.
Eisenbart, 36 Neb. 794, 55 N. W. 252 (1893). The Colorado court has in-
dicated that such a dispute should be decided by the jury. Tadlock v.
Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 173 Pac. 200 (1918).
The Washington rule was first enunciated in Dahl v. Wagner, 87 Wash.
492, 151 Pac. 1079 (1915) where the court said that- the rule has been "the
uniform holding of this court". But the decision of the Dahl case was
based on the logic of Brydges v. Cunningham, 69 Wash. 8, 124 Pac. 131
(1912), and as all the experts agreed in the BTydges case that certain treat-
ment would not have been proper when they weie questioned in light
of all the facts, the Dahl case appears to have been unsupported by apt
precedent.
It is true that it is enough to absolve the physician if the treatment
employed has the approval of at least a respectable minority of the med-
ical profession who recognize it as a proper method of treatment. Lorenz
v. Booth, 84 Wash. 550, 147 Pac. 31 (1915). It is also true that a judgment
against a physician should not be based upon mere speculation and con-
jecture. Dishman v. Northern Pacific Benefit Assn., 96 Wash. 182, 164"Pac.
943 (1917). But a holding that a mere conflict in the expert testimony
entitles the physician to judgment as a matter of law is anomalous and
at variance with settled law and practice in comparable situations.
It is suggested in a well-considered note to the Peddicord case in 13
RocxY MourrAn LAw REviaw 169 that as a practical matter it becomes
nearly impossible to recover from a physician for improper treatment
under the Washington rule because of the requirement of unanimity of
testimonial opinion. Should a physician be given such an immunity?
It is submitted that no sound reason exists for making an exception
in this situation to the general rule and that in the case of a conflict
in expert testimony as to the propriety of medical treatment, the jury
is entitled to resolve the conflict, taking into account the education, train-
ing and experience of the witnesses, their apparent objectivity or lack
of it, their possible bias, the reasons given for their conclusions, their
demeanor and such other considerations .as are usually relevant to a
witness' credibility. J.G.
